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This paper tests empirically the performance of three structural models of 
corporate bond pricing: those of Merton (1974), Leland (1994) and Fan and 
Sundaresan (2000). We show that both Merton and Leland models 
overestimate bond prices while Fan and Sundaresan reveals an extremely good 
performance. When considering the prediction of credit spreads, the three 
models underestimate market spreads but, again, Fan and Sundaresan has a 
better performance. We find a rating, maturity, asset volatility and sector effect 
in the prediction power, as the models underestimate less the spreads of riskier 
firms and of bonds with better rating quality and longer maturity. Moreover, we 
find that spread errors are systematically related with some bond and firm’s 
specific variables, as well as term structure variables. Finally, an econometric 
model developed for equityholders bargaining power shows that it depends on 
proportional liquidation costs, firm’s size and distance to default. 
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Abstract 
 
This paper tests empirically the performance of three structural models of 
corporate bond pricing: those of Merton (1974), Leland (1994) and Fan and 
Sundaresan (2000). We show that both Merton and Leland models overestimate 
bond prices while Fan and Sundaresan reveals an extremely good performance. 
When considering the prediction of credit spreads, the three models 
underestimate market spreads but, again, Fan and Sundaresan has a better 
performance. We find a rating, maturity, asset volatility and sector effect in the 
prediction power, as the models underestimate less the spreads of riskier firms 
and of bonds with better rating quality and longer maturity. Moreover, we find 
that spread errors are systematically related with some bond and firm’s specific 
variables, as well as term structure variables. Finally, an econometric model 
developed for equityholders bargaining power shows that it depends on 
proportional liquidation costs, firm’s size and distance to default. 
 
Keywords: structural models, corporate debt valuation, empirical credit spreads 
 
JEL classification: G12, G13 
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1. Introduction 
The aim of this paper is to test empirically the performance of three structural models of 
corporate debt pricing, namely Merton (1974), Leland (1994) and Fan and Sundaresan 
(2000). With the analysis of prediction errors we evaluate how well can these models fit 
bond prices and credit spreads. We believe this is important because this allows for a 
discussion of which “real world features” are not captured by these models. On the other 
hand, a comparison of the results of the three models permits to determine the extent to 
which some innovations in the models have improved the pricing of risky bonds. We 
refer specifically to the possibility of early default, coupons, taxes and bankruptcy costs 
when we compare Merton (1974) model with Leland (1994) and the effect of strategic 
debt service when we compare Leland (1994) model with Fan and Sundaresan (2000).  
 
Moreover, we evaluate whether there are differences in the performance of the 
models according to rating and maturity of the bonds or according to asset volatility and 
sector of the firms. This analysis seems important because the previous empirical studies 
in the field are not much conclusive. While Ericsson and Reneby (2002) report a better 
performance of Merton model for speculative grade bonds, Eom et al (2004) do not 
confirm that pattern in their sample.  
 
Even considering important the analysis of a rating, maturity and asset volatility 
effect, the study of a sector effect is probably more important as there is very little 
empirical evidence regarding this issue. We believe that the study of a sector effect in the 
performance of the structural models is indeed one of the main contributions of this 
dissertation. If we detect any sector effect, then it would be interesting to analyze which 
characteristics of these sectors can try to explain a better or worst performance. 
 
Another important issue that deserves our attention is the study of systematic 
prediction errors. Are there any bond specific, firms specific or market variables that play 
a systematic relationship with spread errors? Among other factors, we intend to study the 
influence of size, leverage, maturity, rating, asset volatility and firm growing 
opportunities in the performance of the models. This is important not only because the 
existing empirical literature sometimes found some contradictory results in this analysis 
but also because we introduce some new explanatory variables, as the yield to maturity 
and the market-to-book ratio (as a proxy for growing opportunities).  
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As far as we are concerned, this paper is the first study that calibrates and evaluates 
the performance of Fan and Sundaresan (2000) model. There are some calibrations of 
strategic debt services models as the one by Mella-Barral and Perraudin (1997) in Huang 
and Huang (2002) paper. However, they do not explicitly calibrate Fan and Sundaresan 
(2000) model. Furthermore, we introduce an econometric model that tries to explain 
equityholders bargaining power at liquidation. 
 
To implement the empirical study properly, we structure this paper as follows. First, 
we explain the process of data gathering and the calibration procedure adopted to 
implement the models. Then follows the empirical results section where we discuss the 
performance of the models and the systematic prediction errors. Finally, there is the 
conclusion where we summarize the main findings of the dissertation. 
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2. Empirical Implementation 
This section is organized in two parts. First we describe the process of data gathering and 
secondly we present the calibration procedure used to estimate the parameters of the 
models. We provide a specific description of the estimation of each model’s parameters. 
The implementation of the numerical methods is conducted in Excel using Solver. 
 
2.1 Data 
In order to test empirically the models presented earlier it is important to select a sample 
of companies with simple capital structures. Ideally we should have companies with zero 
coupon bonds when testing the Merton (1974) model and companies with perpetual 
bonds when testing the Leland (1994) and the Fan and Sundaresan (2000) models. 
However, since it is not always possible to find these “perfect” bonds in the markets, the 
most reasonable approach consists in selecting bonds that have reliable prices and 
straightforward cashflows. An attempt to use these models to price corporate debt of 
firms with complex capital structures would raise doubts as to whether pricing errors are 
due to the assumptions of the models or to their inability to price this sort of debt. This 
approach has also been adopted in previous empirical studies like the one by Eom et al 
(2004), Ericson and Reneby (2002) and Lyden and Saraniti (2000). While the first two 
studies use companies with simple capital structures but with more than one traded bond, 
Lyden and Saraniti (2000) limit the sample to companies with only one bond. 
 
The first selection criteria used in this study consists in limiting the sample to U.S. 
non-financial firms with no more than three bonds (issued in U.S. dollars). As noticed by 
Eom et al (2004) the leverage ratio of financial firms are not comparable to other firms. 
“Financial firms, such as banks, routinely have leverage ratios above 90%, whereas only 
the least creditworthy non-financial firms use as much debt” (p.4). In addition, the 
following criteria are applied: 
• Consider only coupon bonds with all principal retired at maturity (bullet bonds).  
• Do not include bonds with option features like callable, convertible or putable 
bonds. 
• Do not include floating-rate bonds or bonds with sinking fund provisions. 
• Do not include bonds with time to maturity less than one year, as they are 
unlikely to trade (suggested by Eom et al, 2004). 
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Following these criteria and using DATASTREAM information an initial sample of 
39 companies was obtained. In order to assure the straight application of these criteria, 
there was a double check of the characteristic of the bonds by consulting their prospectus 
on EDGAR database1. After that, two companies had to be eliminated since their bonds 
had call features. Furthermore, in order to assure some reliability of the bond prices, all 
the bonds with the same quote for more than two months (despite the changes in interest 
rates) were excluded. With this refinement the sample was reduced to 30 companies.  
 
As final criterion to select the sample there is the requirement that all these 
companies have publicly traded stock. Stock prices are not only required to compute the 
market value of equity but also to compute the stock volatility. An inspection in stock 
prices obtained from DATASTREAM allowed to detect one company that was 
considered an outlier, which was consequently eliminated from the sample. This 
company entered in bankruptcy in 2003 and its stock price was around zero in the first 
quarter of 2004. In the end there were left 29 companies with a total of 50 bonds. 
 
As regards the time-period of the study, it was set as the period between October 
2001 and the end of March 2004. Since DATASTREAM does not provide bond price 
information prior to 28/09/2001 it was not possible to extend this period.  
 
Another important issue of the data selection process is the frequency of the data. As 
some of the variables of the study rely on accounting data we have to make bond 
information “compatible” with accounting information.  This being so, and trying to 
maximize the number of observations in the time series, it was decided to use quarterly 
observations. In total there are 11 quarters of data for 27 companies and 10 quarters for 2 
companies2, creating 317 observations on which the pricing performance and model 
specification is carried out. This sample can be compared to the one used by Jones et al 
(1984) which consists of a total of 27 firms, Ericsson and Reneby (2002) with 171 firms 
and that of Eom et al (2004) with 182 companies. 
 
                                                 
1 EDGAR database is available at SEC (U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission) web site 
www.sec.gov. 
2 The first company with only 10 quarters of data is United Technologies because the two bonds of this 
company were issued after 30/10/2001, missing the first quarter of data. The second company is 
Worthingthon Industries since at the time this study was conducted the accounting information of the first 
quarter of 2004 was not available. 
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Company Bond Face Value ($M) Issue Date Maturity Date Coupon 
S&P 
Rating
Yield 
Spread (bp)
Industrial
Bond 1 100 28/06/1995 01/07/2005 6.700% A 149.7
Bond 2 250 07/08/2001 15/08/2008 6.500% A 114.5
CNF Inc Bond 1 200 03/03/2000 01/05/2010 8.875% BBB- 374.1
IDEX Corp Bond 1 150 18/02/1998 15/02/2008 6.875% BBB 293.3
Pentair Inc Bond 1 250 30/09/1999 15/10/2009 7.850% BBB 247.5
Bond 1 200 14/08/2001 15/08/2011 6.250% A 107.7
Bond 2 100 28/09/1995 01/10/2005 6.625% A 119.0
Bond 1 300 24/02/1999 01/03/2009 6.750% BBB 238.5
Bond 2 100 04/09/1992 15/09/2004 7.250% BBB 301.0
Bond 1 500 24/04/2002 15/05/2012 6.100% A 75.7
Bond 2 400 23/10/2001 01/11/2006 4.875% A 73.1
Bond 1 150 19/04/2000 15/04/2010 8.500% BBB+ 283.2
Bond 2 100 29/04/1999 01/05/2009 6.500% BBB+ 236.7
Bond 1 250 07/04/1999 01/04/2009 6.000% A+ 132.6
Bond 2 240 02/02/2001 01/02/2006 6.400% A+ 121.6
Average 219.3 6.803% 191.2
Consumer Cyclical
Choice Hotels Int. Inc Bond 1 100 19/10/1998 01/05/2008 7.125% BBB- 339.7
Knight Ridder Inc Bond 1 300 23/03/1999 15/03/2029 6.875% A 148.1
Bond 1 125 21/05/1998 01/06/2028 7.125% BBB 223.5
Bond 2 125 21/05/1998 01/06/2008 6.650% BBB 195.8
Bond 1 300 11/03/1998 15/03/2028 6.950% A- 200.9
Bond 2 250 14/01/1999 15/01/2009 5.625% A- 175.5
Bond 1 200 07/08/1997 15/08/2007 7.125% BBB- 224.2
Bond 2 325 25/09/2002 01/10/2012 7.375% BBB- 129.2
Bond 3 325 26/02/2003 01/10/2012 7.375% BBB- 102.2
Unifi Inc Bond 1 250 05/02/1998 01/02/2008 6.500% B+ 763.8
Average 230.0 6.873% 250.3
Nordstrom Inc
Neiman Marcus Group
Staples Inc
Vulcan Materials
Bemis Co Inc
Temple Inland Inc
United Techonologies
USF Corp
Snap-on Inc
The firms are grouped in a total of six sectors, namely Industrial (9 firms), Consumer 
Cyclical (6 firms), Energy (4 firms), Basic Materials (4 firms), Healthcare (3 firms) and 
Consumer Non-Cyclical (3 firms). This grouping is based on Thomson ONE Banker 
sector convention (Source: http://banker.analytics.thomsonib.com/ta/).  
 
Table 2.1 presents summary statistics on the 50 bonds in the sample. There are a total 
of 10 companies with just one traded bond, 17 companies with two traded bonds and 
only 2 companies with three traded bonds. The average coupon rate for all bonds is 
6.916%, ranging from 4.875 to 8.875%. The Consumer Non-Cyclical sector has the 
bonds with highest coupons and, not surprisingly, is also the one with the highest average 
yield spread, namely 279.9 basis points. The average yield spread is 221.5 basis points 
for all bonds and most of the bonds (88% of the sample) are investment grade bonds 
(rated BBB- or higher). A more detailed analysis of rating and distribution of credit 
spread is conducted in section 5.1. 
 
Table 2.1 – Bonds Summary Statistics 
           (Continues next page) 
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Company Bond Face Value ($M) Issue Date Maturity Date Coupon 
S&P 
Rating
Yield 
Spread (bp)
Energy
Bond 1 150 19/12/2000 15/12/2010 7.625% A- 188.0
Bond 2 100 24/02/1998 15/02/2028 7.125% A- 234.0
Bond 1 150 20/11/1997 15/11/2027 7.200% BBB+ 171.7
Bond 2 150 20/11/1997 15/11/2007 6.750% BBB+ 151.5
Bond 1 250 29/04/1999 01/05/2029 7.050% A- 148.7
Bond 2 350 29/04/2002 01/05/2012 6.375% A- 110.0
Bond 1 125 17/11/1997 15/10/2007 7.450% BB+ 292.6
Bond 2 175 21/02/2001 01/03/2011 7.625% BB+ 273.3
Bond 3 250 08/08/2002 15/08/2012 8.375% BB+ 317.3
Average 188.9 7.286% 209.7
Basic Materials
Bond 1 100 15/06/1995 15/06/2025 7.250% BB+ 189.8
Bond 2 200 20/11/1998 01/12/2008 5.875% BB+ 159.4
Bond 1 175 07/01/1999 01/01/2009 6.000% A+ 157.5
Bond 2 350 26/09/2002 01/10/2012 4.875% A+ 67.5
Sensient Technologies Bond 1 150 22/03/1999 01/04/2009 6.500% BBB- 240.5
Bond 1 150 09/12/1997 01/12/2009 6.700% BBB 470.5
Bond 2 200 21/05/1996 15/05/2006 7.125% BBB 443.6
Average 189.3 6.332% 247.0
Healthcare
Bond 1 235 14/11/2001 15/11/2011 6.875% BBB 142.0
Bond 2 100 23/05/1996 01/06/2026 7.050% BBB 100.8
Guidant Corp Bond 1 350 11/02/1999 15/02/2006 6.150% A- 148.6
Watson Pharmaceutical Bond 1 150 13/05/1998 15/05/2008 7.125% BBB- 295.5
Average 208.8 6.800% 171.7
Consumer Non Cyclical
Bond 1 150 24/09/1999 01/10/2009 7.900% BBB- 274.4
Bond 2 100 20/10/2003 01/11/2013 5.500% BBB- 90.9
Bond 1 200 18/08/1999 15/08/2009 8.450% BBB- 401.4
Bond 2 255 28/06/2002 15/07/2007 8.250% BBB- 340.7
Toro Co Bond 1 100 15/06/1997 15/06/2027 7.800% BBB- 292.2
Average 161.0 7.580% 279.9
All Bonds
Average 205.1 6.916% 221.5
Sd 92.7 0.852% 125.5
Max 500 8.875% 763.8
Min 100 4.875% 67.5
Blyth Inc
Corn Products Int. Inc
Newfield Exploration
Lubrizol Corp
Nucor Corp
Worthington Industries
Beckman Coulter Inc
Energen Corporation
Ensco International
Murphy Oil Corp
Table 2.1 – Bonds Summary Statistics (Cont.) 
 
Table 2.1 reports descriptive statistics for the bonds in the sample. All the information regarding face value, 
issue date, maturity date, coupon and yield spread was obtained from DATASTREAM.  The yield spread for 
each bond is an average of the spread over US treasury bills for the sample period. Rating information was 
obtained from Standard & Poors (www.standardandpoors.com). 
 
 
As mentioned earlier, the implementation of the model requires some accounting 
information, namely information about the liability structure of the firm. Quarterly 
balance sheets for each company were obtained from EDGAR database. Table 2.2 lists 
some descriptive statistics about the firms.  
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Firm
Market 
Value of 
Equity
Market 
Value of 
Total 
Liabilities
Market 
Value of 
Assets
Market 
Leverage
Book 
Leverage
Bonds as 
% of Total 
Liabilities
Avg Bond 
Time to 
Maturity
Stock 
Volatility
Dividend 
Yield
Industrial
Bemis Co Inc 2,567.6 1,191.2 3,758.8 31.7% 53.8% 32.1% 4.4 25.9% 2.3%
CNF Inc 1,560.8 2,123.4 3,684.2 57.6% 73.8% 10.2% 7.4 37.0% 1.3%
IDEX Corp 1,107.9 418.0 1,525.9 27.4% 45.3% 37.0% 5.4 33.2% 1.7%
Pentair Inc 2,023.1 1,443.3 3,466.4 41.6% 55.7% 18.9% 6.9 35.9% 2.0%
Snap-on Inc 1,675.4 1,201.1 2,876.6 41.8% 57.5% 26.2% 5.9 28.3% 3.5%
Temple Inland Inc 2,646.9 2,796.4 5,443.3 51.4% 58.3% 15.0% 4.1 31.2% 2.7%
United Techonologies 33,857.8 20,998.5 54,856.3 38.3% 68.5% 4.1% 6.9 38.1% 1.6%
USF Corp 846.7 719.4 1,566.1 45.9% 52.2% 37.3% 6.9 41.6% 1.2%
Vulcan Materials 4,231.4 1,856.5 6,088.0 30.5% 52.1% 28.0% 4.9 29.0% 2.3%
Average 5,613.1 3,638.6 9,251.7 40.7% 57.5% 23.2% 5.8 33.3% 2.1%
Consumer Cyclical
Choice Hotels Int. Inc 988.7 418.4 1,407.0 29.7% 100.0% 24.3% 5.4 45.8% 0.4%
Knight Ridder Inc 5,304.0 2,632.4 7,936.3 33.2% 63.5% 12.0% 26.4 23.6% 1.7%
Neiman Marcus Group 1,018.4 934.0 1,952.5 47.8% 45.6% 27.6% 15.4 34.7% 0.1%
Nordstrom Inc 3,132.5 2,797.9 5,930.5 47.2% 66.7% 19.7% 15.6 42.9% 1.8%
Staples Inc 9,348.2 2,758.3 12,106.5 22.8% 51.0% 19.0% 7.2 44.8% 0.1%
Unifi Inc 359.7 465.9 825.6 56.4% 50.6% 45.2% 5.4 68.9% 0.0%
Average 3,358.6 1,667.8 5,026.4 39.5% 55.5% 24.6% 12.5 43.5% 0.7%
Energy
Energen Corporation 1,058.7 905.5 1,964.2 46.1% 59.7% 29.6% 16.6 30.4% 2.4%
Ensco International 3,762.5 1,043.2 4,805.7 21.7% 36.1% 31.0% 14.9 48.8% 0.4%
Murphy Oil Corp 4,449.3 2,379.7 6,828.9 34.8% 57.7% 22.4% 17.7 32.4% 1.7%
Newfield Exploration 1,849.2 1,196.3 3,045.4 39.3% 54.1% 38.2% 7.7 31.8% 0.0%
Average 2,779.9 1,381.2 4,161.1 35.5% 51.9% 30.3% 14.2 35.9% 1.1%
Basic Materials
Lubrizol Corp 1,639.4 975.5 2,614.9 37.3% 52.4% 31.9% 14.1 28.6% 3.3%
Nucor Corp 3,918.2 1,905.1 5,823.4 32.7% 45.0% 18.7% 8.1 42.1% 1.6%
Sensient Technologies 994.8 776.9 1,771.6 43.9% 60.7% 19.9% 6.4 28.7% 2.7%
Worthington Industries 1,275.3 835.5 2,110.7 39.6% 57.5% 40.2% 5.5 39.4% 4.4%
Average 1,956.9 1,123.2 3,080.2 38.4% 53.9% 27.7% 8.5 34.7% 3.0%
Healthcare
Beckman Coulter Inc 2,700.1 1,649.8 4,349.9 37.9% 71.3% 21.0% 16.1 32.3% 0.9%
Guidant Corp 13,322.7 1,543.9 14,866.5 10.4% 41.2% 24.4% 3.4 40.8% 0.3%
Watson Pharmaceutical 3,807.1 1,012.7 4,819.7 21.0% 35.2% 15.6% 5.4 45.9% 0.0%
Average 6,609.9 1,402.1 8,012.1 23.1% 49.2% 20.3% 8.3 39.6% 0.4%
Consumer Non Cyclical
Blyth Inc 1,260.2 425.1 1,685.3 25.2% 43.7% 42.5% 8.4 31.4% 0.9%
Corn Products Int. Inc 1,141.0 1,282.8 2,423.8 52.9% 58.8% 30.9% 5.6 27.5% 1.3%
Toro Co 873.0 535.0 1,408.0 38.0% 57.9% 18.9% 24.9 28.8% 0.7%
Average 1,091.4 747.6 1,839.0 38.7% 53.5% 30.8% 13.0 29.2% 1.0%
All Firms
Average 3,886.9 2,042.1 5,929.0 37.4% 56.1% 25.6% 9.7 36.2% 1.5%
Sd 6,382.3 3,723.3 9,938.2 11.2% 12.7% 10.1% 6.2 9.3% 1.2%
Max 33,857.8 20,998.5 54,856.3 57.6% 100.0% 45.2% 26.4 68.9% 4.4%
Min 359.7 418.0 825.6 10.4% 35.2% 4.1% 3.4 23.6% 0.0%
Table 2.2 – Firms Summary Statistics 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2.2 reports descriptive statistics for the firms in the sample. All the figures are an average of the quarterly 
observations for each company (third quarter of 2001 until first quarter of 2004). The market value of equity and 
dividend yield for each quarter was obtained from DATASTREAM as well as stock prices required to compute stock 
volatility. Stock volatility for each quarter is the annualised stock volatility. It was computed using a series of daily log 
returns from the last 250 trading days preceding each quarter. Daily stock prices were also downloaded from 
DATASTREAM. The market value of total liabilities is the sum of the market value of traded bonds and book value of 
other liabilities.  
 
The firms in the sample are reasonably large, as the average market value of assets is 
around $6 billion. For most companies, the market leverage (average 37.4%) is 
substantially below the book leverage (average 56.1%).  
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A more detailed analysis of the liability structure reveals that, on average, the market 
value of traded bonds does not represent more than 25.6% of total liabilities. These 
figures are very similar to previous empirical studies on structural models, namely the 
one by Lyden and Saraniti (2000). The sector with the highest proportion of traded bonds 
in total liabilities is the Consumer Non-Cyclical with 30.8%. Bond time to maturity range 
from 3.4 to 26.4 years but the average is around 9.7 years.  
 
Another interesting statistic is the high stock volatility of these firms (36.2% on 
average). This feature is somewhat related with the high volatility period and downward 
in the U.S. economy that followed the September 11. Revealing its dependence on the 
market evolution, the Consumer Cyclical sector presents the highest volatility of the all 
sample (43.5%). Even though there is some dispersion among sectors, it should be 
noticed that the dividend yield of the sample is relatively low (1.5%). In the Healthcare 
sector it is no more than 0.4% but in the Basic Material sector it is near 3.0%. 
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3. Empirical Results 
This section is organized in four topics. First, we analyse the distribution of credit 
spreads and Risk Neutral Default Probabilities (RNDP) for the total sample and on a 
sectorial basis. Then, in section 3.2, we evaluate the performance of Merton and Leland 
models by interpreting average values of prediction errors in price, yield and spread. In 
section 3.3 there is a discussion of the systematic factors that may explain the spread 
errors of Merton model and finally, in section 3.4, Fan and Sundaresan debt/equity swap 
is discussed. 
 
3.1 Distribution of Credit Spreads and RNDP 
In the data section we reported information about the credit spread for each bond in the 
sample and averages values for each sector (presented in Table 2.1). Now, we are in 
position to improve this analysis, by comparing the observed credit spread with the credit 
spread predicted by Merton and Leland models and an approximation of credit spread 
based in a Merrill Lynch study, as illustrated in Table 3.1. 
 
Table 3.1 – Descriptive Statistics of Spreads by Sectors: Market, Models and Merrill Lynch 
 
While the market spread and the Merton and Leland predicted spreads are averages for the sample period, the 
Merrill Lynch spread is just an approximation of spreads considering certain intervals of years to maturity and 
rating of the bonds. The original study in which we based the Merrill Lynch spread presents averages spreads 
over the period January 1997-August 2003 for U.S. corporate bonds and was obtained from Bloomberg.  
 
Market Merton Leland Merril-Lynch Maturity Rating
All Firms Mean 221.5 58.9 57.1 169.3 9.9 9.6
n = 317 Sd 125.5 111.5 74.7 6.4 2.0
Industrial Mean 191.2 26.8 36.2 148.0 5.8 8.6
n = 98 Sd 92.1 47.2 33.5 1.4 1.7
Consumer Cyclical Mean 250.3 149.3 108.3 203.4 12.5 10.3
n = 66 Sd 182.0 191.4 119.5 7.6 2.6
Energy Mean 209.7 69.9 54.8 169.3 14.8 9.3
n = 44 Sd 68.4 83.8 62.0 5.2 1.7
Basic Materials Mean 247.0 27.4 51.3 169.3 8.6 9.7
n = 43 Sd 141.3 45.4 47.5 3.5 2.3
Healthcare Mean 171.7 44.8 69.0 169.3 8.5 9.7
n = 33 Sd 73.8 73.8 75.4 6.3 1.3
Consumer Non-Cyclical Mean 279.9 14.2 15.2 227.2 12.7 11.0
n = 33 Sd 104.3 14.7 12.3 8.8 0.0
AVERAGE SPREAD
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Prior to analysing these results, we should mention that, for estimation purposes, a 
rating conversion table was constructed. Following Eom et al (2004) and Ericsson and 
Reneby (2002) we assign the number one to the highest rating (AAA+) and the number 
23 to the lowest rating (D). Table 5.2 reports this numerical conversion.  
 
Table 3.2 – Rating Numerical Conversion 
 
The first important conclusion suggested by the results of Table 3.1 is that the 
structural models analysed in this study underestimate the credit spread. This is true not 
only for the averages values of the total sample but also for the industry averages. The 
average market spread of the total sample is more than three times higher than the spread 
predicted by the Merton and Leland models (221.5 bp against 58.9 bp and 57.1 bp, 
respectively). The reasons why these structural models underestimate credit spreads and 
an industry analysis of the underestimation are discussed in more detail in the next 
sections.  
 
Furthermore, Table 3.1 shows that the bonds in the sample also have an average 
market spread higher than the average spread presented by U.S. firms in the Merrill 
Lynch study (169.3 bp in this last case). 
  
Focusing the analysis on observed credit spread, we verify that the Consumer Non-
Cyclical sector has the highest spread (279.9 bp), followed by the Consumer Cyclical 
(250.3 bp) and the Basic Materials (247.0 bp). The result of the Consumer Cyclical sector 
is consistent with the highest coupon rates of its bonds (already reported in Table 4.1) 
and also with its worst rating quality. The average rating in this sector is 11, which 
corresponds to BBB-, the cut-off category of investment grade bonds. In the group of 
bonds with the lowest market spread we have the Energy (209.7 bp), Industrial (191.2 
bp) and the Healthcare (171.7 bp) sectors. These are also the sectors with the best rating, 
which reveals an important association between rating and market spread (the correlation 
between these two variables is 0.56). 
 
S&P Category AAA+ AAA AA+ AA AA- A+ A A- BBB+ BBB BBB-
Number 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
S&P Category BB+ BB BB- B+ B B- CCC+ CCC CCC- CC C D
Number 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23
Speculative Grade
Investment Grade 
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A direct comparison of the observed spreads for each sector with the spreads 
resulting from the Merrill Lynch study reveals that, although Merrill Lynch reports lower 
spreads, the ranking of sectors is quite similar. In the top spread level there is the 
Consumer Non-Cyclical and Consumer Cyclical sectors and in the bottom the Industrial 
sector (ranked fifth according to observed market spread).  
 
In order to improve the analysis of market spread, it is important to have an idea of its 
distribution. Figure 3.1 displays this distribution for the total sample. 
 
Figure 3.1 – Distribution of Market Spread: Total Sample 
 
The distribution of market spread is far from normal. There is a higher concentration 
of observations between 100 bp and 125 bp and then much more observations to the right 
of this range than to the left. Between 150 bp and 350 bp the frequency is quite constant 
and there are some important observations above 700 bp. 
 
An industry analysis of the distribution of market spread, depicted in Figure 3.2, 
reveals some similarities among industries. In none of the sectors does the distribution 
seems to be normal and most sectors reveal a strong dispersion of credit spreads, with the 
exception of Energy. Panel D shows a high concentration of observations above 700 bp 
in the Basic Materials sector. In most sectors ranges of high frequency are followed by 
low frequency and again by high frequency. 
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Figure 3.2 – Distribution of Market Spread by Sector 
          Panel A – Industrial                                Panel B – Consumer Cyclical 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
          Panel C – Energy                                             Panel D – Basic Materials 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
          Panel E – Healthcare                              Panel F – Consumer Non-Cyclical 
 
In addition to the credit spread estimation reported in Table 3.1 it is important to 
analyse the Risk Neutral Default Probability predicted by the models, since these two 
variables are directly related. Table 3.3 summarises the results of this last variable. It also 
reports Moody’s 1-year default rates for bonds during 1999 based on cross sectional 
information about rating and maturity. Although this information is not directly 
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1-Year Default 
Rates (1999)
Merton Leland Moody's Maturity Rating
All Conpanies Mean 12.3% 10.5% 0.11% 9.9 9.6
n = 317 Sd 13.7% 10.4% 6.4 2.0
Industrial Mean 7.8% 7.9% 0,00%-0,11% 5.8 8.6
n = 98 Sd 9.2% 6.1% 1.4 1.7
Consumer Cyclical Mean 22.9% 17.4% 0,11%-1,12% 12.5 10.3
n = 66 Sd 18.6% 15.0% 7.6 2.6
Energy Mean 17.1% 10.1% 0.11% 14.8 9.3
n = 44 Sd 13.2% 9.3% 5.2 1.7
Basic Materials Mean 8.1% 10.6% 0.11% 8.6 9.7
n = 43 Sd 8.4% 8.4% 3.5 2.3
Healthcare Mean 8.4% 11.8% 0.11% 8.5 9.7
n = 33 Sd 11.1% 10.2% 6.3 1.3
Consumer Non-Cyclical Mean 7.1% 3.6% 0,11%-1,12% 12.7 11.0
n = 33 Sd 7.4% 2.7% 8.8 0.0
AVERAGERNDP
comparable with the RNDP it provides an idea of which sectors are likely to present a 
higher default rate. 
 
Table 3.3 – Risk Neutral Default Probabilities (RNDP) and Moody’s 1-Year Default Rates3 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
As expected, the sectors with the highest predicted RNDP are also the sectors with 
the highest predicted spread. The Consumer Cyclical assumes the leading of this ranking 
with a RNDP of 22.9% predicted by the Merton model (predicted spread of 149.3 bp, 
Table 5.1) and 17.4% predicted by the Leland model (predicted spread of 108.3 bp). The 
sector with the lowest  predicted  RNDP (and lowest credit spread)  is the Consumer 
Non-Cyclical, with 7.1% and 3.6% in the Merton and the Leland’s model, respectively. 
 
There seems to be  some  contradiction between this ranking and the ranking based 
on the observed market spread. The  structural  models  predict  the  lowest  RNDP  and  
the lowest  credit  spread  for  the  sector  with  the  highest  market  spread: Consumer  
Non-Cyclical. This underpricing issue will be analysed in more detail in the next section 
but there seems to be a reason for that particular case. The three companies of the 
Consumer Non-Cyclical sector reveal an historical 250 days stock volatility that is quite 
low, which resulted in low asset volatility estimation and consequently a high 
underestimation of credit spread and RNDP by the structural models. 
 
                                                 
3 Source of Moody’s 1-year default rates: Duffie and Singleton (2003). 
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Finally, taking into account cross sectional information about maturity and rating, we 
verify that the overall 1-year default rate is no more than 0.11%. Given its rating 
characteristics, the Consumer Non-Cyclical sector is the one which potentially presents a 
high default rate, namely between 0.11% and 1.12%. With the lowest default rate 
(between 0.00% and 0.11%) is the Industrial sector. This ranking in is accordance with 
the ranking based on the market spread and the Merrill Lynch spread of Table 3.1.   
 
As a summary of this section we can say that the first results of the structural models 
reveal an underestimation of credit spreads and that both the observed credit spread and 
the predicted spreads are characterized by a high dispersion. The RNDP ranges from 
10.5% in Leland model to 12.3% in Merton model. Even though the Consumer Non-
Cyclical and the Consumer Cyclical sectors have the highest market spreads, the 
predictions of the models are not always coincident with this result. 
 
 
3.2 Prediction Errors 
In this section we discuss the performance of the models. How well can the models fit the 
market prices, yields and credit spreads? We decompose the analysis in two parts. First, 
there is a general overview of the models performance by considering all the sample 
observations (section 3.2.1) and then we focus the analysis in several categories, 
according to rating, maturity of the bonds, asset volatility of the firms and sectors 
(section 3.2.2). We test whether the prediction errors are significantly different from 
zero, if there are differences between Merton and Leland’s estimation and whether there 
are differences in the estimation for the categories above mentioned. 
 
3.2.1 Predicted Errors – Total Sample  
Table 3.4 summarizes the prediction errors for the two models considering the total 
sample. The absolute errors in prices, yields and spreads are calculated as the predicted 
prices, yields and spreads minus the observed values of these variables. The relative 
errors are computed as the absolute errors divided by the observed prices, yields or 
spreads. We consider the relative errors to be more informative of the models 
performance since it allows for comparisons between the two models and later on, among 
categories. 
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Absolute 
Error ($M)
Relative 
Error
Absolute 
Error (bp)
Relative 
Error
Absolute 
Error (bp)
Relative 
Error
MERTON Mean 30.4 11.2% -191.9 -30.5% -191.9 -76.2%
Sd 25.2 8.9% 151.2 18.8% 151.2 37.5%
LELAND Mean 10.3 4.5% -58.6 -3.4% -193.8 -75.0%
Sd 36.4 12.3% 148.8 25.7% 140.2 31.1%
PRICE YIELD SPREAD
ALL SAMPLE
 
Table 3.4 – Performance of the Structural Models - Total Sample 
 
Parallel to the predicted errors presented in Table 3.4 we also test whether the mean 
relative errors are different from zero and whether there are differences between Merton 
and Leland means. Tables 3.5 and 3.6 report the p-values for these tests not only for the 
total sample which is analysed in this section but also for the grouping of relative errors 
according to sector, rating, maturity and asset volatility that is discussed in the next 
section. 
 
Table 3.5 – P-Values to Test Mean Zero of the Relative Errors 
 
Table 3.5 reports the P-values for a two-tailed test, which test the following hypothesis for the mean relative 
error. H0: µ = 0 and  H1: µ ≠ 0. The values in bolt refer to cases where we cannot reject the null hypothesis that 
the mean relative error is zero for a 5% significance level. 
 
MERTON LELAND MERTON LELAND MERTON LELAND
ALL SAMPLE 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0186 0.0000 0.0000
INDUSTRIAL 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0093 0.0000 0.0000
CONSUMER, CYCLICAL 0.0000 0.4869 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
ENERGY 0.0000 0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
BASIC MATERIALS 0.0000 0.0090 0.0000 0.0498 0.0000 0.0000
HEALTHCARE 0.0000 0.1309 0.0000 0.0065 0.0000 0.0000
CONSUMER NON-CYCLICAL 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
HIGH RATING 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.1236 0.0000 0.0000
LOW RATING 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
SHORT MATURITY 0.0000 0.3127 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
MEDIUM MATURITY 0.0000 0.0176 0.0000 0.0010 0.0000 0.0000
LONG MATURITY 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
LOW VOLATILITY 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0016 0.0000 0.0000
HIGH VOLATILITY 0.0000 0.0368 0.0000 0.7574 0.0000 0.0000
RELATIVE PRICING 
ERROR
RELATIVE YIELD 
ERROR
RELATIVE SPREAD 
ERROR
P-values
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Table 3.6 – P-Values to Test Equality of Merton and Leland Means 
 
 
Table 3.5 reports the P-values for a two-tailed test, which test the following 
hypothesis for the differences in Merton and Leland means relative errors. 
H0: µMerton - µLeland = 0 and  H1: µMerton - µLeland ≠ 0. The values in bolt refer 
to cases where the equality of means does hold for a 5% significance level. 
 
The first conclusion that can be drawn from Table 3.4 is that both models 
overestimate bonds prices. Merton’s model mean overestimation is about 11.2% and 
Leland’s model is 4.5% (both means are significantly different from zero). The results 
found for the Merton model show an overestimation higher than the 4.5% found by Jones 
et al (1984) and 1.69% by Eom et al (2004). In this last case the author’s believe that the 
lower underestimation found in their study is due to the use of a payout ratio and a cost 
of financial distress in Merton’s model (Eom et al, 2004, p10). Not surprisingly, we 
found that Leland’s model overprices bonds less than Merton’s model (the equality of 
means does not hold for a 5% significance level). This is essentially due to the 
consideration of early default and cost of financial distress in Leland’s model.  
 
Another important issue that should be discussed when analysing both models’ 
relative pricing errors is the distribution of these errors. These are depicted in Figure 3.3. 
ALL SAMPLE 0.0000 0.0000 0.6779
INDUSTRIAL 0.0000 0.0000 0.0538
CONSUMER, CYCLICAL 0.0000 0.0003 0.0728
ENERGY 0.0552 0.0009 0.3472
BASIC MATERIALS 0.0001 0.0000 0.5249
HEALTHCARE 0.0000 0.0000 0.1646
CONSUMER, NON-CYCLICAL 0.5460 0.0000 0.9354
HIGH RATING 0.0000 0.0000 0.7480
LOW RATING 0.0000 0.0000 0.7739
SHORT MATURITY 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
MEDIUM MATURITY 0.0000 0.0000 0.2162
LONG MATURITY 0.2787 0.0023 0.0195
LOW VOLATILITY 0.0412 0.0000 0.0366
HIGH VOLATILITY 0.0000 0.0000 0.9341
P-values
RELATIVE 
PRICING 
ERROR
RELATIVE 
YIELD 
ERROR
RELATIVE 
SPREAD 
ERROR
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Figure 3.3 – Distribution of Relative Pricing Errors 
            Panel A – Merton                                            Panel B – Leland 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.3 provides evidence that the Merton distribution of relative pricing errors is 
skewed to the right while Leland’s distribution is just moderately skewed to the left. This 
reveals a tendency of the Merton model to overestimate bonds more than Leland’s 
model. Figure 5.3 also shows that there is a high dispersion of pricing errors, which is 
more pronounced in Leland’s distribution (standard deviation of 12.3% in Leland against 
8.9% in Merton). In Leland’s model relative pricing errors range from –28% until 49%. 
This pattern of high dispersion is similar to the one found in previous literature. Eom et 
al (2004) report standard deviations of relative pricing errors of 4.94% in the Merton 
model (when the mean is 1.69%) and in other structural models most standard deviation 
of relative pricing errors are quite close to the mean (in level terms).   
 
Regarding the yield and credit spread we notice, as expected, that both structural 
models underestimate these figures. The relative yield error is –30.5% and –3.4% for the 
Merton and Leland models, respectively, and the relative credit spread error is –76.2% 
and –75.0% also for both models, respectively (all means are different from zero). Again, 
we can compare the results for the Merton model with the Eom et al (2004) study.  The 
results found for the yield relative error show less underestimation than Eom et al (2004). 
They found a relative yield error of –91.3% while our is only –30.5%. However, 
considering the relative spread error, the conclusion is somewhat different. Our mean of 
–76.2% shows more underestimation of credit spread than what they found: -54.4%. 
 
The incapacity to generate sufficiently high spreads really seems to be one of the 
main critics of structural models. We might have several explanations for that. Some of 
them rely on technical issues and others on theoretical issues.  
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Regarding the technical issues, there seems to be a tractability problem. We cannot 
forget that both Merton and Leland models are approximating actual straight coupon 
bonds with finite maturity with some “Synthetic type of debt”. In Merton’s case it is a 
zero coupon debt and in Leland model its perpetual debt, with a continuous coupon 
payment. The calibration procedure used to convert “real debt” into “synthetic debt” will 
definitely imply different relationships between yields and prices in the model and in 
reality. That’s one of the reasons why “…a model which produces the correct price will 
not necessarily produce the correct credit spread (Ericsson and Reneby, 2002, p.14). The 
difference in model spread and actual spread – for the same bond price – may be several 
hundreds percent.  
 
From a theoretical point of view, these structural models, which are based on the 
Contingent Claim Theory, tend to generate low credit spreads because they only capture 
the default risk component. Besides the credit risk component, actual credit spreads are 
very likely to include compensation for liquidity (marketability), taxes or systematic risk.  
 
Among these three components, liquidity seems to have more influence in credit 
spread. Huang and Huang (2002) calibrate several structural bond pricing models to 
historical data in an attempt to estimate how much of the corporate bond yield spread is 
due to credit risk. They find that for investment grade bonds it constitutes no more than 
20% of the overall spread, although this fraction is lower for more risky bonds. 
 
The tax component of credit spread raises from the fact that, in some countries, 
namely in the U.S., a state income tax has to be paid on bond coupons and its principal at 
maturity and, as pointed out by Elton et al (2001), “corporate bonds have to offer a 
higher pre-tax return to yield the same after-tax return”. As regards the systematic 
component of credit spread, Collin-Dufresne et al (2001) identified that ¾ of credit 
spread changes are not explained by structural models but rather by systematic factors.  
 
There is another feature related to “real” bonds that these two models do not capture: 
jumps in asset value. These models assume, as we explained in section 3, a geometric 
Brownian motion process for the asset value and, therefore, do not admit sudden changes 
(jumps) in the asset value. Even though these jumps are not so common in practice, there 
may be a small proportion of the market spread that compensates for jump risk not priced 
by the models. 
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When comparing Merton relative spread error with Leland’s relative spread error, we 
would expect a less negative error for the Leland model. Leland’s model not only 
considers the possibility of early default, which is an improvement of the Merton model 
and a closer approximation to reality, but also considers two “real world frictions”, 
namely taxes and bankruptcy costs. The Merton model assumes that upon default 
bondholders will recover 100% of the asset value while Leland’s model assumes a 
recovery rate that is less than 100%. By including these features, we would expect 
Leland’s relative spread error to be lower than Merton’s error. Nevertheless, this is not 
the case in our study. The p-value found for the equality of means (Table 5.6) is 0.6779, 
which reveals that we cannot reject the null hypothesis of equality of means (for a 
significance level of 5%).  
 
Yet, as mentioned earlier, Leland’s calibration was more problematic than Merton’s 
because, during the sample period, the term structure was far from being flat and this 
might have some influence on the pricing results. Table 5.7 shows the sensitivity of 
Leland’s pricing, yield and spread errors to the risk free rate. 
 
Table 3.7 – Leland Errors Sensitivity to the Risk Free Rate 
 
Table 3.7 reports Leland’s absolute and relative predicted errors in price, yield and spread, as well as their 
standard deviation, for several levels of the risk free rate. Except for the first scenario, the risk free rate is 
computed using Nelson-Siegel (1987) risk free yield curve. 
 
Focusing the analysis on the relative price error and the relative spread error 
(columns 4 and 8, respectively), we find that the lowest mean of the relative spread error 
Absolute 
Error ($M)
Relative 
Error
Absolute 
Error (bp)
Relative 
Error
Absolute 
Error (bp)
Relative 
Error
Mean 10.3 4.5% -58.6 -3.4% -193.8 -75.0%
Sd 36.4 12.3% 148.8 25.7% 140.2 31.1%
Risk free (T = 1) Mean -107.2 -29.4% -317.3 -52.0% -136.3 -43.4%
Sd 116.4 24.0% 132.3 14.6% 140.4 48.5%
Risk free (T = 5) Mean -22.3 -5.0% -192.9 -28.9% -170.4 -62.6%
Sd 59.3 16.2% 137.2 17.4% 140.0 39.0%
Risk free (T = 10) Mean 4.7 2.9% -90.4 -9.6% -189.1 -72.5%
Sd 40.6 13.0% 143.5 23.0% 140.2 32.7%
Risk free (T = 15) Mean 13.2 5.4% -35.8 0.8% -196.6 -76.4%
Sd 34.8 11.9% 149.1 26.9% 140.5 30.0%
Risk free (T = 30) Mean 13.6 5.5% -34.6 1.7% -196.7 -76.6%
Sd 33.9 11.8% 158.9 29.1% 140.3 30.2%
YIELD SPREAD
Risk Free implied in 60 
semesters payment of 
$6.916M/2
LELAND MODEL        
All Firms
PRICE
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is obtained for a risk free rate corresponding to a maturity of one year, namely -43.4%. 
However, in this scenario, the relative mean pricing error presents a surprising result of -
29.4%, revealing some contradiction with what we would expect from this structural 
model. This scenario is clearly unreasonable since we would be using a very short 
maturity risk free rate to discount perpetual coupons. 
 
Another interesting figure is that, for a risk free computed for maturities above 10 
years, the relative spread error shows low sensitivity to the risk free rate. The relative 
spread error only changes from –72.5% to –76.6% when we change the maturity of the 
risk free rate from 10 to 30 years. The relative mean spread error adopted for the 
dissertation (scenario one) is clearly in this range, which means that the fact that there are 
no differences between Leland’s and Merton’s relative spread errors estimation is not due 
to the choice of the risk free rate in Leland’s model.  
 
Having compared the mean of Merton and Leland’s relative yield and spread errors, 
we shall now make some considerations about the distribution of these errors, as we did 
for the relative pricing errors. Figure 5.4 illustrates these distributions. 
 
Figure 3.4 – Distribution of Relative Yield Errors and Relative Spread Errors 
          Panel A – Merton Relative Yield Error                       Panel B – Leland Relative Yield Error 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
          Panel C – Merton Relative Spread Error                       Panel D – Leland Relative Spread Error 
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There is a clear distinction between the distribution of yield errors and the 
distribution of spread errors. While the distribution of yield errors has some similarities 
with a normal distribution, the distribution of spread errors shows an extreme 
concentration of observations in the lower bound. This pattern is more pronounced in 
Merton’s distribution. In this case there are 166 observations (52% of total) in  the range 
–99% and –92%. But, at the same time, there are also some important observations with 
very positive spread errors: in the range above 44% there are 10 observations. This 
reveals the high dispersion of spread errors, usually a characteristic of these empirical 
studies. Even though we found a standard deviation of the relative spread error of 37% 
for the Merton model, Eom et al (2004) found a standard deviation even higher, namely 
71.84%. Thus, these structural models have a tendency to predict either a very high 
spread or a very low spread.  
 
The extreme underestimation demonstrated by these models requires a more detailed 
analysis of the observations. There are 35 observations for which the Merton model’s 
prediction spread is less than 1 bp, including 15 observations where the predicted spread 
is so close to zero that the prediction spread error is reported as –100%. On the other 
hand, in the Leland model, there is no prediction of spreads close to zero, which means 
that there are no reported errors of –100%. Still, there is a strong association between 
Merton and Leland’s predicted spreads, as the correlation between these variables is 0.92. 
 
3.2.2 Predicted Errors By Category 
In the previous section we discussed the performance of the structural models 
considering all the observations in the sample. However, there might be differences in the 
estimation errors according to the rating category of the bonds, its maturity or even the 
asset volatility of the firms. In this section we analyse the performance of the models 
according to this grouping and also according to sector. 
 
To detect any rating effect, we divided the sample in two rating categories: high 
rating and low rating. High rating includes bonds with a numerical rating conversion 
below 11 (BBB-) and low rating all other bonds. This does not correspond to the standard 
distinction between investment grade bonds and speculative grade bonds (reported in 
Table 5.2) because there are only 32 observations of speculative grade bonds in the 
sample. It would not seem reasonable to compare results from a sub-sample of 32 
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observations with those from a sub-sample of 285 observations of investment grade 
bonds. The split resulted in 196 observations of high rated bonds and 121 of low rated 
bonds. 
 
As regards the remaining time to maturity of the bonds, we analyse three sub-
samples: short maturity (less than five years), medium maturity (from five to 10 years) 
and long maturity (above 10 years). It corresponds to 49, 169 and 99 observations, 
respectively. It would be interesting to analyse the ability of the models to generate 
reasonable spreads to very short maturities (<1 year) but, as mentioned in the data 
section, we exclude from our analysis corporate bonds with very short maturities as these 
are unlikely to be traded. That is the reason why we consider “short maturity” bonds with 
a remaining time to maturity of 3 and 4 years. 
 
In order to discuss any volatility effects we decompose the sample in low asset 
volatility (below 20%) and high asset volatility (above 20%), which results in two sub-
samples of 152 and 165 observations, respectively. 
 
Table 3.8 gives the p-values of a two-way ANOVA test that evaluates, as a null 
hypothesis, no category effects according to rating, maturity of the bonds, asset volatility 
and sectors. 
 
Table 3.8 – P-Values to Test No Category Effects According to Rating, Maturity, Asset 
Volatility and Sector 
 
 
Table 3.8 reports the P-values for a two-way ANOVA test, which evaluates the following hypothesis for the 
means of relative errors in the Merton and Leland models. 
H0: µHigh Rating  = µLow Rating = 0 and  H1: otherwise.  
H0: µShort Maturity  = µMedium Maturity = µLong Maturity = 0 and  H1: otherwise. 
H0: µLow Asset Volatility   = µHigh Asset Volatility = 0 and  H1: otherwise.  
H0: µIndustrial  = µConsumer Cyclical = µEnergy = µBasic Materials = µHealthcare = µConsumer Non-
Cyclical = 0 and  H1: otherwise. 
The values in bolt refer to cases where there are not category effects for a 5% significance level. 
MERTON LELAND MERTON LELAND MERTON LELAND
SECTORS 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0009
RATING 0.0000 0.0257 0.0000 0.0000 0.0464 0.0128
MATURITY 0.0119 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.1258
ASSET VOLATILITY 0.0000 0.0000 0.0040 0.0454 0.0000 0.0000
RELATIVE PRICING 
ERROR
RELATIVE YIELD 
ERROR
RELATIVE SPREAD 
ERROR
P-values
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Absolute 
Error ($M)
Relative 
Error
Absolute 
Error (bp)
Relative 
Error
Absolute 
Error (bp)
Relative 
Error
MERTON Mean 28.1 8.9% -155.3 -26.3% -155.3 -72.9%
Sd 24.0 7.7% 144.3 18.7% 144.3 41.8%
LELAND Mean 7.3 3.3% -23.4 3.0% -153.7 -71.6%
Sd 35.7 9.7% 141.9 27.7% 125.9 35.1%
MERTON Mean 34.2 14.8% -251.3 -37.3% -251.3 -81.5%
Sd 26.8 9.6% 143.5 16.9% 143.5 28.7%
LELAND Mean 15.1 6.5% -115.6 -13.8% -258.8 -80.6%
Sd 37.3 15.4% 142.3 17.6% 138.4 22.2%
PRICE YIELD SPREAD
RATING MODEL
HIGH RATING
LOW RATING
Considering a 5% significance level, we reject the null hypothesis of no effects in 
Merton’s and Leland’s relative errors (pricing, yield and spread) according to rating, 
maturity, asset volatility and sector, except for the maturity in Leland’s relative spread 
error (p-value of 0.1258). To complement this analysis it is important to analyse the 
values of the relative predicted errors. Once again, we should analyse the magnitude of 
these errors in parallel with tables 5.5 and 5.6 which test the mean zero of the errors and 
the equality between Merton and Leland mean, respectively. 
 
3.2.2.1 Rating 
Table 3.9 displays the mean relative errors according to the rating category of the bonds. 
Both Merton’s and Leland’s models underestimate less the spread for high rating 
categories. Merton’s mean spread error is –72.9% for high rating bonds and –81.5% for 
low rating bonds. The p-value found for the equality between the Merton and Leland 
means (0.7480 for high rating and 0.7739 for low rating, Table 5.6) reveals that the 
equality of means does hold for spread errors.  
 
Table 3.9 – Performance of the Structural Models According to Rating Category 
 
Our findings are in accordance with what we should expect from the performance of 
the models. We should expect a lower capacity of the models to predict spreads of low 
rating bonds because low rating bonds are usually less liquid. Thus, their spread must 
show a bigger compensation for liquidity risk, which is not captured by structural 
models. These models only capture default risk. 
 
A comparison to previous studies shows that our results contradict the results found 
by Ericsson and Reneby (2002). These authors report a better performance of the Merton 
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model for speculative grade bonds. However, Eom et al (2004) does not find significant 
differences of prediction between investment grade and speculative grade bonds for the 
Merton model.  
 
3.2.2.2 Maturity 
In the Merton model the tendency toward underestimation of spread appears to be 
somewhat stronger among short maturity bonds. We can observe in Table 3.10 that 
Merton’s relative mean spread error is –97% for short maturity bonds, -77.4% for 
medium maturities and –63.9% for long maturities. As the p-value of Table 5.8 shows, 
there is clearly a maturity effect in Merton’s spread prediction. In this case our results are 
in accordance with previous studies in the field, namely Ericsson and Reneby (2002) and 
Eom et al (2004).  
 
Table 3.10 – Performance of the Structural Models according to Remaining Time to 
Maturity of the Bonds 
 
We should note that for the Leland model the maturity effect of the relative spread 
error is not significant, as demonstrates the p-value of Table 5.8 (p-value of 0.1258).  
 
3.2.2.3 Asset Volatility 
Another interesting result from our study is that these structural models fit better prices 
and spreads of more risky firms (the p-values from Table 3.8 show a strong volatility 
Absolute 
Error ($M)
Relative 
Error
Absolute 
Error (bp)
Relative 
Error
Absolute 
Error (bp)
Relative 
Error
MERTON Mean 24.5 8.0% -206.7 -40.7% -206.7 -97.0%
Sd 16.8 6.6% 155.7 11.7% 155.7 6.8%
LELAND Mean 1.4 0.9% 45.2 22.4% -184.3 -82.6%
Sd 22.4 6.4% 175.8 34.4% 165.3 15.6%
MERTON Mean 31.4 11.3% -229.4 -34.5% -229.4 -77.4%
Sd 26.2 7.3% 159.6 19.5% 159.6 37.8%
LELAND Mean 5.2 2.0% -70.5 -5.8% -225.5 -72.4%
Sd 38.9 11.1% 147.2 22.9% 147.1 35.4%
MERTON Mean 31.8 12.6% -120.7 -18.4% -120.7 -63.9%
Sd 26.7 11.7% 102.6 13.7% 102.6 41.2%
LELAND Mean 23.4 10.6% -89.6 -12.1% -144.5 -75.7%
Sd 34.5 14.1% 111.8 15.0% 93.3 28.5%
SPREAD
SHORT 
MATURITY
YIELD
MATURITY MODEL
PRICE
LONG 
MATURITY
MEDIUM 
MATURITY
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effect). Table 3.11 reports these findings, which are similar to the ones found by Ericsson 
and Reneby (2002). 
 
Table 3.11 – Performance of the Structural Models According to Asset Volatility of the 
Firms 
 
Merton’s relative price error is 13.6% for low volatile firms and only 8.9% for high 
volatile firms. Concerning the spread, there is an extreme underestimation for low 
volatile firms, namely –93.4%, while for more risky firms this is only –60%. Leland’s 
results show some similarity, especially for the credit spread error. There is also 
empirical evidence that for high volatile firms the Leland model can fit with extreme 
precision the prices of the bonds. Leland’s relative pricing error for this category is 
significantly equal to zero (Table 5.5 reports a p-value of 0.7574 for a mean zero test, for 
a 5% significance level). 
  
3.2.2.4 Sector 
As far as we are concerned, there are no studies with an empirical analysis of the 
performance of these models according to sectors or industries. Thus, this constitutes one 
of the main contributions of this dissertation.  
 
We already mentioned that there exists a sector effect in the performance of the 
models (in Table 3.8 the p-values for the equality of the means among sectors is zero for 
all errors). Now we will analyse which characteristics of the bonds or of the firms 
belonging to these sectors might lead to a better or worst performance of the structural 
models. Table 3.12 depicts the performance of the models according to sector. 
Absolute 
Error ($M)
Relative 
Error
Absolute 
Error (bp)
Relative 
Error
Absolute 
Error (bp)
Relative 
Error
MERTON Mean 39.6 13.6% -202.9 -33.6% -202.9 -93.4%
Sd 25.2 9.4% 125.4 13.3% 125.4 7.8%
LELAND Mean 31.3 11.3% -72.4 -6.4% -196.2 -91.4%
Sd 26.1 10.2% 138.2 25.0% 109.9 8.5%
MERTON Mean 22.0 8.9% -181.9 -27.6% -181.9 -60.3%
Sd 22.1 7.9% 171.4 22.3% 171.4 46.1%
LELAND Mean -9.1 -1.7% -45.9 -0.6% -191.6 -60.0%
Sd 33.8 10.6% 157.3 26.0% 163.6 36.4%
ASSET 
VOLATILITY MODEL
PRICE YIELD SPREAD
LOW 
VOLATILITY
HIGH 
VOLATILITY
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Table 3.12 – Performance of the Structural Models According to Sector 
 
There are two sectors where the Merton model seems to perform better when 
predicting the credit spread: the Consumer Cyclical and the Energy sector. The relative 
spread errors have a mean of  –58% and –62.5% in these two sectors, respectively, when 
the mean for the total sample is –76.2%.  
 
By analysing Tables 2.1 and 2.2, which report descriptive statistics on the bonds and 
the firms according to sector, we verify that these sectors present some characteristics 
usually associated with a better prediction power of the Merton model. The bonds in the 
Consumer Cyclical sector have an average maturity above the average of the total sample 
and its firms also present asset volatilities and leverage levels above the total sample. We 
already tested that Merton model performs better for long maturity bonds and more risky 
firms. Regarding the leverage, the empirical literature shows that Merton’s model usually 
underestimates less the spreads for high leverage firms. In relation to the Energy sector 
Absolute 
Error ($M)
Relative 
Error
Absolute 
Error (bp)
Relative 
Error
Absolute 
Error (bp)
Relative 
Error
MERTON Mean 27.7 9.4% -180.3 -32.5% -180.3 -86.0%
Sd 14.7 6.4% 108.4 14.0% 108.4 26.7%
LELAND Mean 6.7 3.7% -2.7 7.3% -170.9 -77.6%
Sd 27.4 7.1% 135.8 28.0% 109.5 33.4%
MERTON Mean 27.8 10.7% -162.1 -22.3% -162.1 -58.0%
Sd 27.9 9.8% 178.0 19.7% 178.0 41.8%
LELAND Mean 4.4 1.3% -96.5 -10.8% -203.2 -68.9%
Sd 44.4 15.0% 146.1 15.9% 166.9 25.5%
MERTON Mean 42.8 10.6% -135.2 -21.8% -135.2 -62.5%
Sd 37.6 8.3% 115.8 18.0% 115.8 43.1%
LELAND Mean 27.2 6.5% -69.0 -10.1% -150.3 -70.2%
Sd 45.1 11.3% 88.5 13.6% 100.1 33.2%
MERTON Mean 31.4 12.5% -275.1 -37.7% -275.1 -80.6%
Sd 27.1 8.3% 213.5 23.3% 213.5 47.0%
LELAND Mean 4.7 4.1% -97.6 -7.8% -251.2 -74.6%
Sd 36.8 10.2% 179.7 25.9% 189.6 40.2%
MERTON Mean 18.1 6.8% -143.0 -29.3% -143.0 -77.1%
Sd 11.9 4.4% 81.4 16.5% 81.4 33.7%
LELAND Mean -5.4 -2.5% 41.5 14.7% -118.8 -66.8%
Sd 24.2 9.5% 102.0 31.1% 65.4 24.9%
MERTON Mean 38.4 20.5% -302.5 -43.9% -302.5 -95.1%
Sd 23.6 12.0% 101.3 12.6% 101.3 5.8%
LELAND Mean 33.1 18.6% -184.1 -24.1% -301.6 -95.0%
Sd 20.1 13.7% 121.5 14.0% 98.8 4.2%
PRICE YIELD SPREAD
HEALTHCARE
CONSUMER, 
NON-CYCLICAL
MODELSECTOR
INDUSTRIAL
CONSUMER, 
CYCLICAL
ENERGY
BASIC 
MATERIALS
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we believe that the good performance of the Merton model is probably due to the highest 
average time to maturity of its bonds (14.2 years for an overall average of 9.7 years). 
 
In the group of sectors with worst predictive power of the Merton model we found 
the Consumer Non-Cyclical and the Industrial  with  relative  spread  errors  of –86% and 
–95%, respectively. The poor performance in the Industrial sector seems to be due to the 
short average maturity of its bonds (5.8 years, which is the lowest of the sample) and the 
low asset volatility of its firms. As regards the Consumer Non-Cyclical sector it seems to 
be due to the reduced asset volatility of its firms. 
 
The p-values presented in Table 3.6 from the test of equality of means between 
Merton and Leland models show that there are no differences in these means regarding 
the spread prediction of the six sectors (for a 5% significance level). 
 
In relation to the relative price error among sectors we should note the excellent 
performance of the Leland model in the Consumer Cyclical and Healthcare sectors, as 
the mean of this error is statistically zero, considering a 5% significance level (p-value of 
0.4869 in the Consumer Cyclical sector and 0.1309 in the Healthcare sector, as reported 
in Table 3.5). 
 
 
We can summarize the analysis of the predictions errors as follows. Both Merton and 
Leland models overestimate bond prices and underestimate credit spreads. Even though 
in the spread predictions the results are not statistically different from each other, in the 
prices predictions Merton’s overestimation is stronger. We also confirm Eom et al (2004) 
results of high dispersion of credit spread errors. The analysis of the prediction errors by 
category show that both Merton and Leland’s models perform better for bonds with a 
good rating quality and a longer maturity. Moreover, these models perform better with 
riskier firms, those that present high asset volatility and high leverage. 
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3.3 Systematic Prediction Errors 
Up to this point we have discussed the performance of the structural models analysing 
essentially some descriptive statistics of the predicted errors in terms of pricing, yield and 
spread. We considered the mean relative spread error to be the most informative measure 
of the ability of the models to fit credit spreads. In this section, we consider in more 
detail the question of why the models’ predictions are inaccurate. With a multivariate 
regression analysis we examine the relationship between the relative spread error and a 
set of bond specific, firm specific and economy wide variables. The goal is to identify 
some systematic factors that cause the weaknesses of the models. This analysis covers 
the entire sample as well as several categories of rating, maturity, asset volatility and 
sector. 
 
The methodology used in this section is somewhat similar to the methodology used 
by Eom et al (2004), Ericsson and Reneby (2002) and Lyden and Saraniti (2000). All 
these authors perform a multivariate regression analysis instead of a single regression 
analysis. They argue that a combination of factors leads to higher or lower prediction 
errors and, therefore, analysis in a multivariate regression setting is more appropriate.  
 
Nevertheless, there are some differences in the choice of the dependent variable. Eom 
et al (2004) use the relative spread error as the dependent variable while Ericsson and 
Reneby (2002) and Lyden and Saraniti (2000) use the absolute spread error. But, even 
the spread error is not defined in the same way by all these studies. While the first two 
use the definition of error as we do, Lyden and Saraniti (2000) use an inverse definition, 
which leads to positive errors for these models4. Following the most recent empirical 
paper in the field, the one by Eom et al (2004), we use the relative spread error as 
dependent variable, which makes our findings directly comparable to this study.  
 
In the list of explanatory variables we consider size, leverage, asset volatility, market-
to-book ratio and stock return as firm specific variables. We use the market value of 
assets as a proxy for size. Leverage is the market leverage, defined as the ratio of the sum 
of market value of trade debt and book value of non-traded by the market value of assets. 
We use the definition of market-to-book ratio presented by Rajan and Zingales (1995) as 
the ratio of market value of assets to book value of assets. This variable in intended to 
                                                 
4 As mentioned earlier, we define relative spread error as the difference between the predicted spread 
minus the observed spread divided by the observed spread. 
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Credit 
Spread
Merton 
RSE
Leland 
RSE Size Lever.
Yrs to 
Mat.
Asset 
Volatil. Rating
MB 
Ratio
Stock 
Return
Obs.   
YTM
Level of 
TS
Slope of 
TS
Credit Spread 1.00
Merton RSE -0.01 1.00
Leland RSE -0.11 0.87 1.00
Size -0.31 0.12 0.31 1.00
Leverage 0.33 0.14 -0.07 -0.17 1.00
Yrs to Mat. -0.18 0.18 -0.05 -0.08 0.06 1.00
Asset Volatility 0.20 0.60 0.67 0.08 -0.43 -0.15 1.00
Rating 0.56 -0.01 -0.12 -0.33 0.26 -0.13 0.11 1.00
MB Ratio -0.19 -0.12 0.03 0.18 -0.64 -0.14 0.32 -0.11 1.00
Stock Return -0.11 -0.31 -0.35 0.06 -0.21 0.11 -0.25 -0.05 0.24 1.00
Obs.   YTM 0.84 0.11 -0.08 -0.31 0.30 0.20 0.21 0.46 -0.21 -0.02 1.00
Level of TS 0.12 0.06 0.00 -0.02 -0.08 0.10 0.17 0.00 0.06 0.12 0.51 1.00
Slope of TS -0.26 -0.06 -0.01 0.04 0.07 -0.11 -0.20 0.00 -0.03 -0.05 -0.55 -0.63 1.00
stand for the firm’s growing opportunities. The stock return is computed as the 
annualised stock return of the last 250 days prior to the quarter considered for each firm.  
 
We also evaluated whether we should consider the tangibility of a firm’s assets in the 
list of firm specific variables. As proposed by Rajan and Zingales (1995), the tangibility 
can be approximated by the ratio of fixed assets to total assets. However, we decided not 
to include this variable as it presents a strong association with leverage, one of our 
explanatory variables. The inclusion of both variables could create multicollinearity 
problems in our regressions. 
 
As bond specific variables we use the remaining time to maturity of the bonds, the 
rating (again with the numerical conversion of Table 5.2) and the observed yield to 
maturity. Since each regression is estimated using bond prices observed in a variety of 
interest rate environments we consider two control variables related to term structure. 
The ten-year yield is used to measure the level of the term structure and the difference 
between the ten and two year yields to measure the slope. In order to have a first picture 
of the relationship between the variables used in the regressions, we present below the 
correlation matrix. 
 
Table 3.13 – Correlation Matrix 
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Regression 1 Regression 2 Regression 1 Regression 2 Regression 1 Regression 2
Intercept -290.832 -250.831 -2.065 -2.111 -1.641 -1.661
(0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Size -0.004 -0.004 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.343) (0.020) (0.014)
Leverage 373.623 341.318 1.927 1.821 1.445 1.452
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Yrs to Maturity 1.003 0.019 0.018 0.010 0.010
(0.543) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Asset Volatility 322.267 327.076 3.461 3.470 3.362 3.370
(0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Rating 34.903 34.132 0.008 -0.002
(0.000) (0.000) (0.399) (0.767)
Mk-to-Book Ratio 6.962 -0.041 -0.041 -0.044 -0.044
(0.602) (0.005) (0.004) (0.000) (0.000)
Stock Return 0.119 0.118 -0.003
(0.002) (0.002) (0.925)
Observed YTM -9.765 -8.636 -9.185 -9.318
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Level of Term Structure 6.470 5.821 5.928 6.050
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.000)
Slope of Term Structure -6.058 -6.239 -6.472
(0.079) (0.037) (0.026)
Adj. Rsq 0.35 0.34 0.83 0.83 0.84 0.84
ANOVA F statistics 27.74 41.65 156.96 222.55 166.15 208.96
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Autocorrelation Test
Durbin-Watson 1.92 1.94 1.66 1.66 1.96 1.96
Heteroscedasticity Test
n R2* 0.86 0.56 0.17 0.22 3.16 3.19
χ21,0.050 3.84 3.84 3.84 3.84 3.84 3.84
Independent 
Variables
Dependent variables: observed credit spread for "CREDIT SPREAD" and relative 
spread error of the bond pricing model for "MERTON" and "LELAND" 
CREDIT SPREAD MERTON LELAND
3.3.1 Credit Spread Regression 
As a first check on our explanatory variables, we ran a regression with the market spread 
as the dependent variable. In this case we only considered a group of six independent 
variables that we consider to be the most relevant for the explanation of observed credit 
spread, namely size, leverage, years to maturity, asset volatility, rating and market-to-
book ratio. This is reported as credit spread regression in Table 3.14. Latter on we will 
explain the rationality of all other regressions presented in this table. 
 
Table 3.14 – Regression of Credit Spread and Relative Spread Errors: Total Sample 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3.14 reports regression coefficients and their p-values (in parentheses). In the ANOVA F 
statistics section all the values in parenthesis also correspond to p-values. Regression 1 includes all 
explanatory variables (with significant and non-significant parameters) and regression 2 includes only 
variables with significant parameters, considering a 5% significance level. We always start our 
estimation with regression 1 and then regression 2 is obtained using a backward elimination strategy. 
For a Durbin-Watson statistics higher than 1.65 there is no autocorrelation and for a value of n R2* 
lower than χ21,0.05 there is no heteroscedasticity.  
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From the six parameters considered in the credit spread regression, only maturity and 
market-to-book ratio are not statistically significant. The others show a sign that is 
consistent with the results found by Ericsson and Reneby (2002). The negative sign of 
the size parameter reveals that bigger firms have lower spreads. This happens essentially 
for two reasons. First, bigger firms are considered to be safer firms and thus have low 
default risk. This is in some sense reinforced by the negative correlation between rating 
and size (-0.33), meaning that small firms are more likely to have speculative grade 
bonds and thus, more default risk.  
 
Secondly, bonds belonging to bigger firms are considered to be more liquid than 
bonds belonging to smaller firms. This means that the market spread should be lower for 
bigger firms since this spread does not have to provide a high compensation for liquidity, 
as is the case of smaller firms. Liquidity really seems to be one reason to explain the sign 
of the size parameter. Some authors5 consider the issue size to be a good proxy for 
liquidity of the bonds.  A larger issue would intuitively be more liquid. Even not 
considering the issue size as an explanatory variable we found that the correlation 
between issue size and firm size is 0.70, which means that bigger firms are very likely to 
have very liquid bonds. 
 
Using Eom’s et al (2004) definition of safer firms (with low leverage and low asset 
volatility) we found that safer firms have low credit spreads. It should be noticed the high 
sensitivity of credit spread to leverage and asset volatility, as the parameters for these two 
variables in regression 2 are 341.318 and 327.076, respectively. In accordance with the 
previous results we also verify that low quality rating is strongly associated with higher 
spreads (as the coefficient for rating presents a value of 34.132).  
 
3.3.2 Errors Regressions 
Having analysed some explanatory variables of the credit spread we shall now make 
some considerations about the spread error regressions presented in Table 3.14. We focus 
the analysis on regression 2 as these include only significant parameters. The first 
conclusion that we can draw from these regressions is that these models underestimate 
credit spreads. We had already reached this conclusion when analysing the mean values 
of the relative spread errors in the previous section and now we confirm that by verifying 
                                                 
5 See for example Ericsson and Reneby (2002). 
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that the intercept coefficient is negative and statistically significant. The lower coefficient 
found for the Merton model (-2.111 against –1.661 in Leland) seems to indicate that the 
Merton model underestimates more the credit spread than the Leland model but, as we 
mentioned in the previous section, this difference is not statistically significant.  
 
In the list of firm specific variables, four from the five variables have a systematic 
relationship with the Merton spread error, namely leverage, asset volatility, market-to-
book ratio and stock return. In the Leland model size also bears some relationship with 
the errors but, on the other hand, stock return has no influence in explaining these errors. 
Our results indicate that both models underestimate less the spread for riskier firms, i.e., 
firms with high leverage and high volatility. Again, this is more evident for the Merton 
model.  
 
During the estimation procedure we notice that the adjusted R2 decreases a lot when 
we dropt the asset volatility from the list of explanatory variables. This confirms the 
extreme importance of this variable in explaining the relative spread errors of the Merton 
model, in line with the findings of Eom et al (2004). These authors refer that Merton’s 
errors are systematically related to asset volatility in all their regressions. Moreover, this 
pattern might reveal that these structural models have indeed many problems in 
explaining the observed market spreads due to their simplifying assumptions about 
reality. All the models discussed in this dissertation assume constant asset volatility. The 
introduction of a stochastic process for volatility would probably benefit the performance 
of these models, as the estimation results depend considerably on the value found (and 
assumed) for asset volatility.  
 
In Leland’s results the underestimation is also lower for bigger firms, which is in 
accordance with the earlier discussion about liquidity risk. Bonds of bigger firms are 
more liquid (they have low proportion of credit spread due to liquidity risk) and since 
Leland does not price liquidity risk, the underestimation will be lower. 
 
The negative coefficient of the market-to-book ratio variable indicates that the 
underestimation bias is stronger in companies with high growth opportunities. We 
believe that this is due to the fact that companies with high growth opportunities usually 
have less leverage and, as previous empirical results also suggests these models have a 
worst performance in low leverage firms.  
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As regards the bond specific variables, only maturity and observed yield to maturity 
play a role in explaining the spread errors. Longer maturity bonds are subject to less 
underestimation of the models. It is well known the difficulty these models have to 
predict high spreads for short maturity bonds. On the other hand, the regression analysis 
does not confirm the better capacity of these models to predict spreads of high rating 
bonds, as we concluded in the predictions errors section.  
 
The only term structure parameter that has a statistically significant relationship with 
Merton’s spread errors is the level. The higher the level of the term structure the lower is 
the underestimation of the structural models. Despite this empirical relationship, the 
reasons for that are not obvious. In a previous study where this variable was used, the one 
by Eom et al (2004), it was not found statistically significant. This was the only variable 
that did not match our results with the results of Eom et al (2004). All other parameters 
previously discussed presented the same sign and absolute values not so different from 
theirs. This certainly reinforces our study since we use a sample of 29 bond portfolios 
while Eom et al (2004) use a much larger sample of 182 bonds. Moreover, it should be 
noticed the high R2 of our regressions. 
 
In addition to the above regressions that apply to the total sample we also ran some 
regressions according to the categories presented in section 4, namely different classes of 
rating, maturities, asset volatility and sectors. The results did not improve the analysis 
already done for the total sample. Thus, we do not report these estimations.  
 
 
3.4 – Fan and Sundaresan (2000) 
Our first approach to Fan and Sundaresan debt/equity swap assumes that we do not 
differentiate firms according to the bargaining power of equityholders and debtholders at 
liquidation. This is clearly a simplistic assumption but makes possible a comparative 
static’s analysis regarding some variables of this model. In Figure 3.7 we show the 
sensitivity of the bankruptcy threshold, debt, equity and firm value to the bargaining 
power parameter. We report the predicted mean values for each of these variables, using 
the calibration procedure that estimates simultaneously the unlevered firm value and 
asset volatility and considers the bargaining power parameter as an input.  
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Figure 3.7 – Sensitivity of Bankruptcy Threshold, Debt, Equity and Firm Value to the 
Bargaining Power Parameter 
 
By assigning more bargaining power to equityholders (as η approximates 1) we 
benefit the equityholders but the decrease in debt value is such that after a certain point 
(in this case when η is higher than 0.5) there is a loss in the firm’s value. Thus, the 
solution presented in Anderson and Sundaresan (1996) where equityholders have all the 
bargaining power is not the most efficient. The company benefits more if there is some 
balance between the bargaining power of its claimants.  
 
Moreover, as equityholders bargaining power increases, the firm starts reaching the 
bankruptcy trigger earlier than before, leading debtholders to require a higher credit 
spread to compensate for a higher default risk. This last pattern is illustrated in Figure 
3.8. 
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Figure 3.8 – Sensitivity of Credit Spread to the Bargaining Power Parameter 
 
As we mentioned earlier, it does not make sense to assume that the bargaining power 
parameter is the same for all companies. Since it cannot be observed in the market, the 
most reasonable approach seems to determine an implied parameter. We implement this 
approach by extending the previous calibration procedure to provide simultaneously the 
unlevered firm value, asset volatility and the bargaining power parameter. The result is a 
mean value of 0.522 for the parameter, with a standard deviation of 0.119. This figure 
suggests that the assumptions of the Leland model, that debtholders have all the 
bargaining power (η = 0), do not fit completely with reality. What seems to hold, at least 
for our sample, is almost an equal distribution of bargaining power between 
equityholders and debtholders. 
 
With this new “real world feature” we should expect Fan and Sundaresan’s model to 
outperform the Leland model. This is indeed verified in our estimation, as show the 
results of Table 3.16.   
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Absolute 
Error ($M)
Relative 
Error
Absolute 
Error (bp)
Relative 
Error
Absolute 
Error (bp)
Relative 
Error
LELAND Mean 10.3 4.5% -58.6 -3.4% -193.8 -75.0%
Sd 36.4 12.3% 148.8 25.7% 140.2 31.1%
FAN & SUNDARESAN Mean -2.8 0.5% -33.5 0.4% -168.7 -64.9%
Sd 39.5 13.0% 143.4 25.8% 133.2 37.0%
ALL SAMPLE
PRICE YIELD SPREAD
Table 3.16 –A Comparison of Leland and Fan and Sundaresan Prediction Errors 
 
 
 
 
The assumption of a differentiate bargaining power parameter for all observations 
really seems to approximate Fan and Sundaresan predictions to the market values, as we 
observe that the mean relative pricing error and the mean relative yield error are almost 
zero (a mean zero test performed on these means indicates that they are statistically equal 
to zero, considering a 5% significance level). Furthermore, the relative spread error 
decreases from –75.0% in Leland model to –64.9% in Fan and Sundaresan model. This 
improvement is just due to the consideration of the bargaining power parameter since Fan 
and Sundaresan’s debt/equity swap is identical to Leland’s model when we assume that 
debtholders have all the power.  These results confirm the importance of debt 
renegotiation in a firm’s financing decisions.  
 
We are now in position to make some considerations about the factors that might 
influence the magnitude of the bargaining power between equityholders and debtholders. 
We ran a multivariate regression where the bargaining power parameter is the dependent 
variable and a set of variables accounting for size (unlevered firm value), market value of 
debt, proportional liquidation cost α (computed as one minus the recovery rate 
determined for each company) and distance to default (we use Vu/Vb as a proxy) are 
explanatory variables. The estimation results are presented below (the values in 
parenthesis are the p-values associated to each coefficient).  
 
η =  0.3796 + 0.0000 (Size) – 0.0001 (Market V. Debt) + 0.3345 (α) – 0.0120 (Vu/Vb) 
              (0.000)      (0.0903)                (0.3003)                                       (0.0000)             (0.0000) 
 
Adj. R2 = 0.208 
F statistics = 20.54 
 
If we assume a 5% significance level, only two parameters are significant: the 
parameter associated with the proportional liquidation cost and the parameter associated 
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with the proxy of distance to default. The sign of these parameters is not surprising. 
Equityholders have a higher bargaining power when the liquidation costs at liquidation 
are higher and when the asset value is closer to the bankruptcy trigger. Moreover, the 
larger the liquidation costs are, the more benefits equityholders can obtain through debt 
renegotiation. 
 
Since we can assume a positive relationship between the recovery rate (one minus the 
proportional liquidation cost parameter) and the tangibility of the firm’ assets, we can say 
then that equityholders are likely to exercise less bargaining power in firms with a high 
proportion of fixed assets, namely buildings, plants, machinery. Instead, firms that 
depend essentially on human capital, like IT or consulting firms are likely to have 
equityholders with greater power to negotiate with debtholders.   
 
If we relax the significance level to 10%, we verify that there will be a significant 
relationship between the bargaining power parameter and the size of the firm.  As 
expected, equityholders, who are the ultimate owners of the firm, have a greater potential 
to exercise their negotiation power in bigger companies. This applies not only to 
debtholders but also to other stakeholders (there is evidence that bigger companies also 
have a higher market power). As regards to the amount of debt the regression does not 
assigns a significant statistical relationship to its parameter. 
 
The model that we present to explain the bargaining power parameter can probably 
be extended to include other variables. These include the age of the firm, the number of 
creditors or even the legal regime where the company operates. We do not include the 
fist two variables in our model because of practical problems in obtaining precise 
information for the companies in our sample. As regards the legal regime, there is no 
need to consider this variable since all our companies operate in the U.S. 
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4. Conclusion 
This paper tests empirically the performance of three corporate bond pricing models 
using a sample of 29 U.S. companies, with simple capital structures between the third 
quarter of 2001 and the first quarter of 2004. In particular, we implement the models of 
Merton (1974), Leland (1994) and Fan and Sundaresan (2000). We analyse the prediction 
errors in price, yield and spread as measures of the performance of the models and then 
we examine whether there are systematic factors that can explain the relative spread 
errors. The discussion incorporates a decomposition of the companies by sector, which is 
new in relation to most recent empirical studies in the field. 
 
While the Merton and Leland models overestimate bond prices, Fan and 
Sundaresan’s model does not reveal bias in the estimation of these prices, as we cannot 
reject the null hypothesis of mean zero in Fan and Sundaresan pricing errors. We find 
relative price errors of 11.2%, 4.5% and 0.5% for the three models, respectively. These 
results suggest that the introduction of early default, coupons, taxes and bankruptcy cost 
in the Leland model and the assumption of a differentiate bargaining power in Fan and 
Sundaresan’s model is a major improvement in Merton’s pricing framework.  
 
If we rely on relative spread errors as a measure of the model’s performance, we 
conclude that the three models underestimate credit spreads. We find relative spread 
errors of –76.2%, -75.0% and –64.9% for the Merton, Leland and Fan and Sundaresan 
models, respectively. However, this measure does not confirm the differences between 
Merton and Leland’s predictions to be statistically significant. Furthermore, we find a 
high dispersion of both the observed credit spread and the predicted spreads. These 
models can either predict very low spreads or very high spreads, depending considerably 
in the estimation of asset volatility. This might reveal the importance of assuming a 
stochastic process for asset volatility. 
 
An analysis of the predictions errors by category reveals the existence of important 
rating, maturity, volatility and sector effects. Both Merton’s and Leland’s models 
perform better in bonds with a good rating quality. The lower liquidity of speculative 
grade bonds seems to be one of the main reasons why these models underestimate more 
the credit spreads of these bonds. Our results also clarify Eom at al (2004) analysis about 
rating. On the other hand, they contradict Ericsson and Reneby (2002) who report less 
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bias of the Merton model for speculative grade bonds. Moreover, we confirm the better 
performance of these models in bonds with longer maturity and in riskier firms (high 
leverage and high asset volatility). The decomposition of the spread prediction errors by 
sector permits to verify that both the Merton and Leland models fit better spreads in the 
Consumer Cyclical and Energy sectors as the bonds in these sectors have longer 
maturities and belong to firms with high leverage and high asset volatility. In the bottom 
line we find the Consumer Non-Cyclical and Industrial sectors. 
 
We find empirical evidence that the market spread is positively related with leverage 
and asset volatility. In addition, it is higher in bonds with low rating quality. However, 
we cannot validate an empirical relationship between credit spread and both maturity and 
market-to-book ratio.  
 
Among the firm’s specific factors that can explain spread errors we find the leverage, 
asset volatility, market-to-book ratio, stock return and size (this last one only in Leland’s 
errors). As regards the bond specific variables we conclude that the errors are 
systematically related with maturity and yield to maturity. While the level of term 
structure has a systematic influence in the spread errors of all models, the slope has only 
impact in Leland’s errors.  
 
The results of the econometric model that we developed for the bargaining power 
parameter in Fan and Sundaresan’s model suggest that the proportional liquidation costs, 
firm’s size and distance to default have an empirical relationship with equityholders 
bargaining power. 
 
In sum, it is clear the difficulty of these structural models to accurately predict bond 
prices and credit spreads. However, these problems vary in a cross sectional basis 
according to several bond and firm specific features, as well as according to market 
conditions. A challenge for future research is thus, from a theoretical point of view, the 
development of tractable structural bond pricing models that are able to fit better credit 
spreads and bond prices. Future empirical research should try to extend the industrial 
analysis of the performance of these models, incorporating other industries, and 
evaluating whether these models perform differently according to country, as the market 
conditions can vary significantly among countries. 
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